## \$1230

DOS Review Completed.

### ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

# INFORMATION

#### SECRET/NOFORN

August 20, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

DR. KISSINGER

FROM:

JOHN H. HOLDRIDGE

SUBJECT:

Recent Indications of Peking's Views on


Taiwan Question in Sino-American

Relations

central question in Sino-American r told Reston about the need for the pr hostilities), and Peking's positi significantly.	<del>-</del>
recover its sovereign territory by a	a could give a promise not to
recover its soverough territory by a	Chou
En-lai might make a statement to P; could itself interpret as Chinese in	
	That the U. S has already
changed its stance on Taiwan was de talks with Chou En-lai continued for change, China must not miss the chi	20 hours. Given the U S. polic

#### SECRET/NOFORN

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/10/27 : LOC-HAK-16-1-81-3



25X1

As described in the State memorandum to you at Tab A, the essay makes the point that negotiation is a form of confrontation by other means, and in the present context of your Peking visit and the President's upcoming China trip is probably intended to reassure those Chinese who fear that negotiating with the U. S. implies an abandonment of revolutionary fervor or confrontation with the U. S.

SECRET/NOFORN

31230



#### DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

August 5, 1971

# CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Mao Quotes and the President's Trip to Peking

In connection with President Nixon's trip to Peking, Chinese officials are being asked to study certain selections from the writings of Chairman Mao and Lin Piao. The selections have been related by analogy to the opening of PRC negotiations with the US.

The quotations, the most relevant of which are derived from Chairman Mao's discussion of Communist negotiation with the Chinese Nationalists in Chingking shortly after World War II, are obviously intended to reassure those Chinese who fear that negotiating with the US implies an abandonment of revolutionary fervor or confrontation with the US. They emphasize that negotiation is a form of confrontation by other means, remarking that "sometimes, not going to negotiations is tit-for-tat; and sometimes, going to negotiations is also tit-for-tat. We were right not to go before, and also right to go this time; in both cases we have given tit-for-tat."

The quotations go on to suggest, however, that the PRC may be "prepared to make such concessions as are necessary and as do not damage the fundamental interests of the people." "Subject to the principle of not damaging the fundamental interests of the people, it is permissible to make certain concessions in exchange for peace. . ., which the people of the whole country need." "Stick for stick and carrot for carrot. Such is the revolutionary dual policy."

# CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

One quote hints at the PRC's official interpretation of US motivation in seeking negotiations when it refers to the factors which brought Chiang Kai-shek to negotiate with the Chinese Communists after World War II: "The subjective desire of Chiang Kai-shek is to maintain his dictatorship and destroy the Communist Party, but many objective difficulties stand in his way. Therefore, he has to be a little realistic. He is being realistic, and we are realistic too. He was realistic in inviting us and we were realistic in going to negotiate with him."

(NOTE: The source of these particular quotes is the July 26 edition of a Hong Kong Chinese-language paper, WEN HUI PAO. The articles from which they are taken, particularly "On Chungking Negotiations" are now being read throughout China in Mao Thought study sessions in accord with the quoted Mao dictum: "Policy and tactics are the life of the party; leading comrades at all levels must give them full attention and must never on any account be negligent.")

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL